

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1



3 September 1960

25X1

Copy No. C 76

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



3
DOCUMENT NO. _____
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S O
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 76-2
DATE: 10/10/09 REVIEWER: _____

25X1

25X1



State Dept. review completed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300030001-9

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300030001-9

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

3 September 1960

DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

25X1

25X1

25X1

USSR-UN: Prior to the announcement that Khrushchev would head the Soviet delegation to the UN General Assembly, Deputy Minister Kuznetsov on three separate occasions attempted to persuade Hammarskjold to issue invitations to President Eisenhower, Macmillan, and De Gaulle, as well as Khrushchev. Khrushchev has also written to Nehru urging him to attend. These overtures probably reflect Khrushchev's desire to use his UN appearance to underscore his commitment to a policy of coexistence and high-level talks with free-world leaders, particularly on disarmament.

25X1
dw

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300030001-9

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300030001-9

25X1

25X1



25X1

Iran: The demonstration by Iranian nationalist students in Tehran on 1 September was easily broken up by police. Army units had also been alerted to be ready to move against the demonstrators if necessary, [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] Meanwhile, [redacted] no
newly "elected" members of parliament are resigning to clear the way for another round of elections, following the Shah's order. Opposition elements reportedly are elated by the prospects of new elections. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Malagasy Republic: Parliamentary elections in the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) on 4 September will be the first important test of strength between President Tsiranana's pro-Western coalition government and the Congress party for the Independence of Madagascar (AKFM), an extreme nationalist party dominated by militant Communists. Although tribal rivalry and the republic's attainment last June of independence within the French Community should benefit the moderate parties, the AKFM appears to have attracted wide support since its strong showing in municipal elections last fall. The AKFM is well organized and reportedly has been receiving substantial financial support from the French Community Communist party and the Sino-Soviet bloc. [redacted] no

25X1

25X1

3 Sept 60

DAILY BRIEF

iii

25X1

25X1

III. THE WEST

25X1

 Peru-Cuba: Peru is considering breaking relations with Cuba. President Prado, under pressure from the Peruvian military, has agreed in principle to this move when the time is propitious and particularly if other Latin American countries take similar action. Guatemala and Nicaragua broke relations with Cuba earlier this year. Colombia, which is incensed by a recent vitriolic outburst by the Cuban ambassador in Bogota, will *no*

3 Sept 60

DAILY BRIEF

iv

25X1

25X1

25X1

probably at the least declare him persona non grata. Venezuelan President Betancourt, who has become increasingly hostile toward Castro and is concerned by the threat of pro-Castro violence to his regime, also seems to be nearing a break.

25X1

3 Sept 60

DAILY BRIEF

v

25X1

Cuba-Communist China. In the most vindictive attack on the United States of this year, Fidel Castro defiantly announced on 2 September Cuban intention to establish diplomatic relations with the Peiping regime. In a speech billed as the answer of the "Cuban people" to the OAS warning against accepting Sino-Soviet bloc support, Castro put in effect withdrawal of his country from the inter-American system and from the Western alliance. A staged rally of some 300,000 Cubans gave its endorsement to Castro's acceptance of Chinese, as well as Soviet, military aid "if we are attacked."

Communist China, which has devoted a considerable propaganda effort to Latin America in recent years, has achieved a major diplomatic breakthrough in securing its first diplomatic recognition in the Western Hemisphere. Cuba, with a Chinese community of about 30,000--the largest in Latin America--will be a particularly valuable base for the Chinese Communists in spreading their influence in Latin America.

Castro's announcement follows by four days the signing of a joint statement by Cuba and North Korea in which they agreed to exchange ambassadors "as soon as possible." Cuba will be the first non-bloc country to establish diplomatic relations with Pyongyang. [redacted]

25X1

3 Sept 60

DAILY BRIEF

vi

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300030001-9

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300030001-9

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300030001-9
Peru Considering Breaking Relations With Cuba

Peru is considering breaking relations with Cuba, apparently to recoup some of the prestige it lost through Foreign Minister Porras' actions at the seventh meeting of foreign ministers in San Jose. After Peru had initiated the meeting, Porras failed to take the lead in promoting the resolution against extracontinental intervention in the hemisphere, defied his government's instructions, and finally refused to sign. President Prado, under pressure from the Peruvian military, has agreed to this move when the time is propitious, and particularly if other Latin American countries take similar action. Guatemala and Nicaragua broke relations with Cuba earlier this year. Colombia, which is incensed by a recent outburst by the Cuban ambassador in Bogota, will at least declare him persona non grata. Venezuelan President Betancourt, who has become increasingly hostile toward Castro and concerned by the threat of pro-Castro violence to his regime, also seems to be approaching a break.

Prado is reluctant to force the resignation of Porras, a friend of the leftist but non-Communist APRA party, for fear of alienating the APRA's general backing of his administration. The cabinet unanimously censured his actions at San Jose, and the military representatives are insisting on his ouster.

APRA, a bitter enemy of the Peruvian military and conservative elements, has tended to sympathize with the objectives of the Cuban revolution; a dissident and militant wing of the party is strongly pro-Castro. However, Ramiro Priale, APRA's top leader in Peru, who advised Prado that the party would accede to a break of relations with Cuba, has informed the US Embassy in Lima that it will not withdraw its support of Prado in the event Porras resigns--presumably voluntarily.

Porras' position at San Jose was similar to that of Venezuelan Foreign Minister Arcaya, a stanch supporter of Castro, who refused to sign the final resolution of the meeting which was approved by his government. This development has caused considerable tension in Venezuela, where pro-Castro groups are strong, and could threaten President Betancourt's three-party coalition.

THE PRESIDENT**The Vice President****Executive Offices of the White House**

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

National Security Agency

The Director

National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300030001-9

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/09/04 : CIA-RDP79T00975A005300030001-9

TOP SECRET